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When you get a ‘‘going concern’’ letter, the average investor says that’s a terrible thing.
It doesn’t mean that at all. The Internet is a brand new thing, and we don’t know the
rules yet.
C. E. Koop M.D., CEO of drkoop.com (Simmons 2000)
1. Introduction
The study of periods of market euphoria, such as Holland’s seventeenth-century tulip
mania, England’s eighteenth-century South Sea Company, America’s nineteenth-century
railroads, or, most recently, the U.S. housing market, is a topic of long-standing interest
to economists. Theorists specify conditions under which market participants and institu-
tions cause ‘‘bubbles’’ to arise and persist and empiricists test participant-centric or institu-
tion-centric explanations (Hong, Scheinkman, and Xiong 2008; Schultz 2008; Greenwood
and Nagel 2009). In this paper, we study a different participant other than one that stands
to gain from price ﬂuctuations. We are interested in how auditors behave during periods
of market euphoria. Given their gatekeeper responsibility to act in the public’s interest,
along with the seeming inevitability of bubbles (Rampell 2009), it is important to study
how auditors behave during euphoric market conditions. To address this question, we
examine auditor going-concern (GC) opinions around the time of the wave of stressed
Internet ﬁrms ﬁling to go public on NASDAQ, the capital markets entry point for the
companies that went on to constitute ‘‘dotcom mania’’.
To some, the answer to this question is straightforward: auditors became acquiescent.
[B]ubbles . . . change the behavior of gatekeepers. . . . [I]n a bubble . . . auditors, and
other gatekeepers may relax their usual skepticism amidst the market euphoria that a
sustained bull market generates. . . . [I]n an atmosphere of market euphoria . . . inves-
tors generally rely less on gatekeepers . . . . Accordingly, if we assume that euphoric
investors will largely ignore the auditor, the rational gatekeeper’s best competitive
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strategy, at least for the short term, is to become as acquiescent and low cost as possi-
ble. (Coffee 2004: 278, 293)
However, while it may seem conventional wisdom to think auditors were compliant
during the Internet bubble, there are reasons to question this conjecture. For one, the
specter of litigation under the Securities Act of 1933 should discipline auditors when con-
ducting an initial public offering (IPO) audit. For another, in contrast to other gatekeep-
ers (attorneys, underwriters), independence rules that preclude auditors from beneﬁting
from a client’s stock price ﬂuctuations and professional standards require they maintain a
degree of skepticism. Perhaps most important, access to equity capital during the dotcom
bubble was likely quite salient to auditor GC decisions. Given that standards require they
evaluate management’s plans if auditors have substantial doubt about GC status, if a cli-
ent anticipates stock offerings to ﬁnance their operations it seems appropriate auditors
should consider equity market conditions when making their GC decisions (e.g., IPO cash
burn and the potential for seasoned equity offerings). As such, because professional stan-
dards direct auditors to consider ‘‘mitigating factors’’, such as future ﬁnancing, what may
appear to some critics as ex post consistent with auditor acquiescence may have been ex
ante rational for auditors.
Despite these reasons in support of rational decision making during the Internet
bubble, claims of less independence or skepticism on the part of auditors during this time
period may also have merit (Weil 2001). While a hot market for IPOs implies a hot market
for IPO audits, Internet IPO registrants were unique in terms of a very high volume of
ﬂedgling, stressed companies. Upon confronting this wave of registrants, and given the fees
they were receiving and (perhaps more importantly) expecting to receive, there were argu-
ably ample opportunities and incentives for auditors to accede to their client’s wishes for a
clean opinion. As with Schultz and Zaman’s 2001 observation that the ‘‘hot issue market
for Internet initial public offerings is an unprecedented phenomenon’’ (348), Internet IPOs
were a hot audit market without precedent. Speciﬁcally, from the standpoint of the audit
ﬁrms, Internet IPOs represented an audit-market bubble in terms of an abrupt increase in
transaction volume of audits of stressed companies ﬁling to go public; a market phenome-
non distinct from the equity-market bubble these securities went on to represent in terms
of a dramatic increase in stock prices.
The main empirical issue we face is identifying counterfactuals against which to assess
the effect of euphoric audit market conditions on auditor decisions (i.e., benchmarks of
auditor decisions during noneuphoric audit markets). Initially, we address this two ways.
First, we compare the rate of GC opinions for Internet IPO versus non-Internet IPO regis-
trants from 1996 to 2000. We document a sharp decrease in GC opinions for Internet IPO
registrants ﬁling to go public in 1999, at which time there was a sharp increase in the num-
ber of such companies trying an IPO, versus an increase in GCs for non-Internet IPO reg-
istrants at this time. Second, we examine the rate of GC opinions for stressed public
companies with Big 5 auditors in COMPUSTAT for ﬁscal 1995 to 1999. As is the case
with non-Internet IPO registrants, we report an increase in the rate of GC opinions for
public companies with ﬁscal 1998 and 1999 ﬁnancial statements.
Given these ﬁndings, we focus on the subset of Internet IPO registrants that are not
spin offs, that ﬁle to go public on NASDAQ, retain domestic auditors, and manifest an
obvious indicator of ﬁnancial distress (negative net income, negative operating cash ﬂow,
or negative stockholders’ equity). Upon sorting these registrants by the day the auditor
signs the opinion in the registration statement, it is evident the Internet IPO audit-market
bubble inﬂates quickly in January 1999 and bursts abruptly in April 2000. Accordingly,
we examine auditor GC opinions during this audit-market bubble vis-a`-vis the surround-
ing non-bubble periods.
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It is important to emphasize that the 16-month Internet IPO audit-market bubble was a
period during which the Big 5 were especially dominant, with a market share of 97 percent.1
That is, due in part to the high fraction of registrants with venture backing and prestigious
underwriting, the Internet IPO bubble was a Big 5 phenomenon (Megginson and Weiss
1991); as the non–Big 5 ﬁrms, most of which audit just a single registrant in our sample, did
not experience a euphoric audit market. As such, the sharp decrease in GC opinions for
Internet IPO registrants starting in January 1999 stems entirely from the Big 5. Aside from a
few ‘‘strange cases’’, such as PricewaterhouseCooper’s opinion in drkoop.com’s 1999 S-1
(opening quote),2 the large majority of Big 5 opinions during the Internet IPO audit market
bubble do not refer to substantial doubt regarding a stressed registrant’s GC status.
Our interest is whether auditor GC decisions vary with changes in external conditions
towards euphoric markets. After controlling for characteristics that extant literature asso-
ciates with GC opinions for public companies (e.g., ﬁnancial distress, company size, and
age), we test several inﬂuences that could lead auditors to shift their GC criteria in the
Internet IPO bubble. Certain of these (IPO cash burn, equity-market conditions, prestige
underwriting, venture capital backing) are proxies for client-speciﬁc mitigating factors;
whereas others (recent fees from auditing such clients, dotcom mania, fear of client loss,
pressure to rush-to-market) are proxies for auditor-speciﬁc explanations. We also consider
the endogeneity of the IPO decision and assess costs to investors from the decrease in Big
5 GC opinions during the bubble.
Consistent with literature on stressed public companies, we ﬁnd that the presence of a
GC opinion in the IPO registration statement of a stressed Internet company varies posi-
tively with ﬁnancial distress and negatively with company age (for Big 5 registrants) or
startup status (for non–Big 5 registrants). In addition, a GC opinion for Big 5 registrants
varies positively with IPO cash burn and negatively with the presence of a prestigious
underwriter and venture backing. All three of these ﬁndings are new to the literature and
provide support for ‘‘mitigating factors’’ to justify the absence of a GC opinion for a
stressed Internet IPO registrant. Consistent with the descriptive statistics, regression results
show that the Big 5 ﬁrms rendered signiﬁcantly fewer GC opinions during the audit mar-
ket bubble from January 1999 to April 2000 in comparison to the surrounding periods
and to the non–Big 5. We also document negative associations between a GC opinion and
the fees a given Big 5 ﬁrm received from auditing stressed Internet IPO clients during the
three months prior to signing their opinion and whether the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission (SEC) ﬁling date follows soon after audit opinion date. These latter two ﬁndings,
also new to the literature, are not reconcilable by appeal to professional audit standards
and, instead, are suggestive of less independence or less skepticism on the part of the Big 5
during the Internet IPO bubble.
To assess costs to investors associated with the decrease in Big 5 GC opinions during the
Internet IPO bubble, we use the Big 5’s GC decisions during the pre-bubble period to
develop an expectation for their decisions during the bubble, which we contrast to their
actual GC decisions during this latter period. Then, for the two-thirds of our registrants dur-
ing the bubble that went public, we identify those that delist from the Center for Research in
Security Prices (CRSP) for negative reasons within two, three, and four years of IPO date.
Among registrants in the highest decile of expected GC opinions (of which over half of those
1. Based on the audit opinion date, the number of stressed Big 5 (non–Big 5) NASDAQ Internet IPO
registrants went from 2.4 (0.4) per month for January 1996 to December 1998 to 28.4 (1.0) per month for
January 1999 to April 2000.
2. drkoop.com went public in a NASDAQ IPO on June 8, 1999 for $9 per share, raising gross proceeds of
$84,375,000, with opening and closing prices that day of $12.63 and $16.44, respectively. Within a month,
the price rose above $45. However, by its one-year anniversary the price was around $1 and the shares
delisted on April 27, 2001.
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that went public delisted for negative reasons within four years), the actual GC rate is 9 per-
cent versus an expectation of 33 percent. Therefore, if the Big 5 kept opining on Internet reg-
istrants during the bubble as during the pre-bubble, more IPOs would have had opinions
providing investors with an early warning of eventual delisting. However, because these costs
to investors are not visible at earlier post-IPO stages, we do not assert violations of audit
standards.3 Having said this, we emphasize that an IPO can delist only if it goes public in the
ﬁrst place and, because the Internet bubble burst so abruptly, approximately one-third of
our stressed registrants with clean opinions never went public.
Independent auditors play a crucial role in the capital-raising process, though this role
is largely invisible. Indeed, from a ﬁnancial statement user’s perspective, the two visible
aspects are the audit ﬁrm and their opinion. While these facets have ongoing value, they
are of special value during periods of market euphoria because auditors are in arguably
the best position among gatekeepers to be objective. We examine these aspects during a
recent period of euphoria in the equity and audit markets, the Internet IPO bubble. Our
ﬁndings suggest auditor GC decisions accord with both economic reasons or ‘‘mitigating
factors’’ and less independence or skepticism.
In terms of contribution, a study of a market bubble and auditor GC decisions is
new to the literature. Beyond this, our paper extends two streams of extant literature.
One, by studying determinants of GC opinions for IPOs, we extend papers that take the
presence of such opinions as exogenous and examine their information and predictive
content (Willenborg and McKeown 2000; Weber and Willenborg 2003). In this regard,
we report new results that support mitigating factors to justify the absence of a GC
opinion for a stressed IPO registrant. Two, we contribute to literature that uses the
propensity to issue a GC as a proxy for auditor independence in response to economic-
based incentives such as client size (Reynolds and Francis 2000) or fees (DeFond,
Raghunandan, and Subramanyam 2002; Craswell, Stokes, and Laughton 2002; Hope
and Langli 2010). In contrast to this latter stream, our ﬁnding that the presence of a
GC opinion is inverse with recent fees a given ﬁrm receives from auditing stressed Inter-
net IPO clients seems consistent with less independence on the part of auditors during a
period of market euphoria.
2. Background and motivation
By most accounts the Internet IPO market was a phenomenon without precedent, both in
terms of the high volume of stressed and ﬂedgling companies trying to go public and, for
those that did, by their exceptional ﬁrst-day returns (Schultz and Zaman 2001). Whereas
some theory papers provide conditions under which the pricing of Internet stocks may
have been rational (Schwartz and Moon 2000; Pa´stor and Veronesi 2006), most literature
characterizes this period as a bubble (e.g., Ljungqvist and Wilhelm 2003). Accordingly,
studies examine potential causes, such as a rush for market share (Schultz and Zaman
2001), a ‘‘get big fast’’ cascade (Goldfarb, Kirsch, and Miller 2007), stock analyst afﬁlia-
tion (Bradley, Jordan, and Ritter 2008), or misperceptions regarding the long-term beneﬁts
of investing in stocks (Brennan 2004).4
3. As for ex post consequences to auditor themselves, a check of the Stanford Securities Class Action data-
base reveals no instances of litigation against audit ﬁrms pertaining to the IPOs of the Internet companies
in our sample.
4. The ﬁnance literature also examines explanations for why, in Spring 2000, the Internet bubble burst so
abruptly (Ofek and Richardson 2003; Schultz 2008) and for the high levels of Internet IPO underpricing
(Ljungqvist and Wilhelm 2003). Accounting literature examines the valuation and returns of Internet
stocks (Trueman, Wong, and Zhang 2000; Demers and Lev 2001; Bartov, Mohanram, and Seethamraju
2002; Davis 2002; Core, Guay, and Van Buskirk 2003; Rajgopal, Venkatatachalam, and Kotha 2002,
2003; Keating, Lys, and Magee 2003).
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In terms of transaction volume, Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2003) report the number
of Internet IPOs increases from 19 in 1996 to 22 in 1997 to 39 in 1998 and then to
257 in 1999 and 135 in 2000; the majority of which in the ﬁrst half of 2000. Moreover,
the large majority of these issuers, particularly IPOs in 1999 and 2000, display obvious
indicators of ﬁnancial distress; the presence of which are well-known prerequisites to
observing GC opinions (Hopwood, McKeown, and Mutchler 1994; DeFond et al.
2002).
Our interest is whether auditor decisions vary with changes in external market con-
ditions. Due to the conﬂuence of four facts, the Internet IPO bubble provides an
opportune setting for this question. One, there are few facets of the audit market that
are unambiguously attributable to auditors; most notably whether their opinion conveys
substantial doubt regarding a company’s ability to continue as a going concern. Two,
we observe GC opinions only when companies exhibit obvious indicators of ﬁnancial
distress. Three, a dramatic increase in IPO ﬁlings (in absolute and relative terms) by
ﬁnancially stressed Internet companies took place during 1999–2000.5 And four, the
SEC requires auditors to consent to inclusion of their opinion, which either does or
does not refer to GC status, in a client’s IPO registration statement. Taken together,
the Internet IPO bubble provides a relatively clean context to study our research
question.
To examine how auditors behave during a period of market euphoria, we test the
following (non–mutually exclusive) inﬂuences that could lead auditors to shift their GC
opinion criteria during the Internet IPO bubble. Certain of these (IPO cash burn, prevail-
ing equity-market conditions, prestige underwriting, and venture backing) are proxies for
client-centric mitigating factors. Others (participation in the market euphoria, dotcom
mania, fear of client loss and pressure to facilitate a ‘‘rush to market’’) are proxies for
auditor-centric explanations.
IPO cash burn
Given audit standards regarding the assessment of GC status, it is appropriate that audi-
tors should consider the rate of IPO cash burn when making their opinion decisions for
companies that are planning to go public. The difﬁculty for an archival empirical study is
that, while auditors were likely privy to cash ﬂow forecasts, we can only observe actual
pre-IPO operating and investing cash ﬂows for IPO registrants and actual post-IPO oper-
ating and investing cash ﬂows for those IPO registrants that successfully go public. Given
our focus on the auditor’s opinion decision for IPO registrants, we choose the former, pre-
IPO perspective.
Following Keating, Lys, and Magee 2003, we specify CashBurn to measure the extent
a registrant’s IPO proceeds plus on-hand liquid assets could sustain its historical operating
and investing cash ﬂows. To compute this, we divide the sum of annualized pre-IPO
operating and investing cash ﬂows by the sum of IPO proceeds and pre-IPO cash and
marketable securities and (because this numerator is negative more than 95 percent of the
time) multiply this quotient by minus one. Because a more positive CashBurn suggests a
5. Schultz and Zaman (2001) report that over 90 percent of Internet companies going public from January
1999 through March 2000 were unproﬁtable. In addition, Ritter and Welch (2002: 1801) observe, ‘‘it was
unusual for a prestigious investment banker in the 1960s and 1970s to take a ﬁrm public that did not have
at least four years of positive earnings. In the 1980s, four quarters of positive earnings was still standard.
In the 1990s, fewer and fewer ﬁrms met this threshold. Still, the investment banking ﬁrm’s analyst would
normally project proﬁtability in the year after going public. During the bubble, ﬁrms with no immediate
prospect of becoming proﬁtable became common.’’
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registrant will use up its on-hand and IPO cash more quickly, we expect a positive associa-
tion between CashBurn and a GC opinion.6
Equity-market conditions
If auditors have substantial doubt about a client’s ability to continue as a going concern,
audit standards require them to evaluate management’s plans for dealing with this uncer-
tainty. If the client is ﬁling to go public and management foresees subsequent equity offer-
ings to ﬁnance day-to-day operations, auditors likely consider future equity market
conditions when formulating their IPO GC decision.7 Our primary proxy for auditor’s
equity market expectations is the cumulative return on the NASDAQ Composite Index
for the three calendar months prior to the month the auditor signs the opinion in the IPO
registration statement (Nasdaq3).8 If auditors expect equity market performance to
increase, thereby increasing the availability of seasoned equity for their stressed clients, we
would expect the frequency of GC opinions to decrease.
Prestige underwriting and venture backing
As Schultz and Zaman (2001) document, Internet IPOs were much more likely to have the
backing of venture capital ﬁrms and underwriting of prestigious investment banks.
Because these professional investors and intermediaries assist in monitoring, governance,
development and ﬁnancing (Sahlman 1990; Lerner 1995; Gompers 1995; Black and Gilson
1998; Kaplan and Stromberg 2003; Hochberg, Ljungqvist, and Lu 2007), all of which cor-
relate with a company’s status as a going concern, we expect inverse relations between the
presence of a GC opinion and prestige underwriting and venture backing. To proxy these,
we specify PrestigeIB equal to one if the lead underwriter has the highest Carter, Dark,
and Singh 1998 ⁄ Loughran and Ritter 2004 rank and VC equal to one if the registrant
has the backing of venture capitalists.9
Whether or not an audit ﬁrm participates in the market euphoria
Likely because of the high fraction of registrants with the backing of venture capital
ﬁrms and underwriting of prestigious investment banks, the Internet IPO bubble was a
period during which the Big 5 ﬁrms were especially dominant. Accordingly, because the
6. Our CashBurn measure is ex ante in nature in that its numerator is historical, pre-IPO operating and
investing cash ﬂows and its denominator assumes the proceeds are forthcoming. As such, it is a ﬂawed
measure. As one can infer from Table 3A, average CashBurn for Big 5 Internet IPO registrants is 0.143
which implies these companies, if they continue to burn cash at their most-recent historical rate and if they
receive the IPO proceeds, have about 7 years of cash. However, of these 554 registrants, just 383 success-
fully went public within a year of initial SEC ﬁling and ﬁle a Form 10-K or 10-Q on Edgar. For these
383, if we use their actual, post-IPO cash burn (instead of their most-recent historical rate), the mean
value of cash burn is 0.680, which implies less than 1.5 years of cash. Our results do not change if we sub-
stitute this ex post measure of cash burn and estimate Equation 1c using these 383 observations, other
than (not surprisingly) that this ex post measure has no statistical relation with GCOpinion.
7. Some assert auditors went too far in terms of their expectations of future equity market conditions. Per
Weil 2001( C1): ‘‘if an auditor has substantial doubt about a client’s ability to continue as a going con-
cern, it must say so in its report on the company’s ﬁnancial statements. Investors often take those warn-
ings to mean ‘run for the hills’ and the inclusion of one can kill a company’s plans to go public . . . but
rather than questioning the sustainability of the bubble at a time when some dot-coms had stock-market
valuations at several hundred times their revenues, critics say many auditors appear to have presumed the
capital markets would remain buoyant.’’
8. We also consider an alternative proxy pertaining to recent IPO underpricing (see footnote 26).
9. PrestigeIB underwriters are Credit Suisse First Boston, Deutsche Bank, Donaldson, Lufkin and Jenrette,
Goldman Sachs, J. P. Morgan, Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, and Salo-
mon Smith Barney. We use various sources (e.g., Securities Data Corporation (SDC) and Venture Capital
Journal) to code the VC variable.
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non–Big 5 did not participate in the bubble, smaller audit ﬁrms had little opportunity to
vary their GC decisions with euphoric audit market conditions. Therefore, we can use
the non–Big 5 as a benchmark to compare the opinion decisions of the Big 5 for the
audit market bubble versus non-bubble. While auditor choice is endogenous, our test of
the difference-in-differences potentially mitigates this concern. The test for the effect of
euphoric audit market conditions on GC opinion decisions is (Pr(GC)Big 5, AuditBubble –
Pr(GC)Big 5, Non-AuditBubble) < (Pr(GC)Non–Big 5, AuditBubble – Pr(GC)Non–Big 5, Non-AuditBubble).
To conduct this test, we regress a GC opinion on an indicator variable if the opinion
date is during the period of high audit transaction volume January 1999 to April 2000
(AuditBubble). We estimate this regression separately for Big 5 and non–Big 5 registrants
and test if AuditBubble’s coefﬁcient for the Big 5 minus AuditBubble’s coefﬁcient for the
non–Big 5 is less than zero.
The extent to which an audit ﬁrm gains from participating in the market euphoria
The above test hinges on whether an audit ﬁrm participates in the market euphoria,
either before the bubble starts or in contrast to ﬁrms that do not participate. For three
reasons, this is not a very strong test. One, our deﬁnition of the audit-market bubble
(January 1999 through April 2000) is ex post in nature. Two, because other things took
place alongside the surge in stressed Internet IPO audit volume, a simple time-period
indicator variable is not a strong proxy. Three, because they were minor players in the
Internet IPO market, using the non–Big 5 ﬁrms as a benchmark is not a high-power
test. Because auditors are economic agents that clients hire and pay, it is important to
consider the auditor’s incentives (Antle 1982). As an ex ante proxy for the effect of audi-
tor incentives during euphoric market conditions on GC decisions, we specify the
fees from auditing stressed Internet IPO registrants a given Big 5 ﬁrm receives during
the three months prior to the month they sign the opinion for a stressed Internet IPO
registrant (Fees3).10
The throes of ‘‘dotcom mania’’
With the beneﬁt of hindsight, especially the vanishing returns on Internet stocks, it is pos-
sible that some market participants were in the grip of a ‘‘dotcom mania’’. One prominent
example of this phenomenon is Cooper, Dimitrov, and Rau 2001, which documents large
positive stock appreciation to companies that change to an Internet name. Cooper et al.
conclude (2387), ‘‘our results are driven by a degree of investor mania — investors seem
to be eager to be associated with the Internet at all costs’’. To test whether auditors were
susceptible to a similar irrationality, we follow Cooper et al. 2001 and specify a variable
equal to one if an Internet IPO registrant’s name contains the words ‘‘dotcom’’, ‘‘dotnet’’,
or ‘‘Internet’’’(DotName).
Fear of client loss
As a client’s cost of an auditor switch decreases, this should increase the client’s threat to
replace their auditor, who may feel pressure to acquiesce so as to retain the client
(Matsumura, Subramanyam, and Tucker 1997). We proxy for auditor switching costs
10. For example, prior to their March 1999 GC opinion for drkoop.com, PwC signed opinions for 23 other
stressed Internet IPO clients from December 1998 through February 1999 and received cumulative fees of
$6.436 million. Overall, because this variable ranges from zero to over $13 million, we logarithmically
transform it for our regressions. In addition, because 15 of the 20 non–Big 5 ﬁrms audit just one registrant
and another three ﬁrms audit two registrants (one ‘‘pre- bubble’’ and one ‘‘bubble’’), speciﬁcation of this
variable is not feasible for the non–Big 5.
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by whether their auditor’s ofﬁce is within 50 miles of San Francisco, California
(NorthCalif).11 Because of the high concentration of Internet companies in this geographic
region, and the familiarity that auditors likely have with their business models, the costs
of switching auditors should be lower.12
Pressure to facilitate a client’s ‘‘rush to market’’
Lerner (1994) provides support for the view that venture capitalists are adept at timing
IPOs of biotechnology companies to go public at or near market peaks. Similarly, in a
survey of chief ﬁnancial ofﬁcers, Brau and Fawcett (2006) report the presence of venture
backing raises managerial awareness to time an IPO to coincide with high equity market
conditions. Because a registration statement must contain audited ﬁnancial statements, if a
company is ‘‘rushing to market’’ auditors may feel pressure to render a clean opinion for
inclusion in the prospectus. To test this, we specify indicator variables for whether the
number of days from audit opinion date to IPO ﬁling date is ten or fewer (RushToMkt)
and for the interaction between this and whether the IPO has venture backing (Rush-
ToMkt*VC).13 We regress GC opinion on these variables, and test whether the coefﬁcients
for RushToMkt and RushToMkt*VC are less than zero.
3. Sample, variables and descriptive statistics
Sample
To obtain a sample of Internet IPO registrants, we use http://www.alert-ipo.com to iden-
tify 816 IPO ﬁlings from 1996 to 2000 by companies this Web site designates as ‘‘Internet-
related’’, from which we eliminate 47 registrants without a registration statement on Edgar
and 13 foreign issuers that ﬁle an F-1 registration statement.14 For the remaining 756
registrants, we code the opinion from the registration statement. To obtain a sample of
non-Internet IPO registrants, we develop a Web application to search the Edgar database
for registrants whose initial SEC ﬁling is an S-1 or an SB-2, write a program to extract the
opinion from the registration statement, and use keywords to code whether it refers to
substantial doubt regarding the company’s GC status.
GC reporting for all IPO registrants and stressed public companies
Panel A of Table 1 shows the frequency of GC opinions for IPO registrants that ﬁle their
initial registration statement from 1996 to 2000, which we partition into Internet and non-
Internet companies. Consistent with Yung, Colak, and Wang 2008, which categorizes this
period as a ‘‘hot’’ IPO market, the number of registrants is high, ranging from 722 in
11. The next closest audit ﬁrm ofﬁce is in Woodland Hills, California, about 300 miles beyond our 50-mile
radius.
12. An alternative measure would be the number of audit ﬁrms near the IPO ﬁrm. However, because 97 per-
cent of Big 5 observations (537 of 554) are registrants with an opinion signed by a ﬁrm in a major city or
metropolitan area where all ﬁve ﬁrms are resident, it is not feasible to specify such an alternative proxy
for auditor switching costs.
13. Our rationale for specifying such a cutoff is due to the skewed nature of the ﬁling lag between audit opin-
ion date and SEC ﬁling date. For example, for Big 5 registrants, the mean is 53 days and the median is
19 days, 39 percent of which have a ﬁling lag of 10 days or fewer (see footnote 30 regarding the robustness
of the 10-day cutoff).
14. We use this data source because it better suits our research question by casting a broader net to identify
Internet IPO registrants, in contrast to the subset of successful IPOs by Internet companies. As such, our
screen of 816 IPO ﬁlings largely encompasses the Internet IPOs per Jay Ritter’s Web site, SDC, or in
extant literature (Trueman, Wong, and Zhang 2000; Ljungqvist and Wilhelm 2003). Having said this, we
acknowledge the inherent subjectivity regarding classifying a company as Internet-related. To address this,
per panel A of Table 2, we exclude registrants that are public company spinoffs to exclude brick-and-
mortar retailers with Web sites (e.g., BarnesandNoble.com).
8 Contemporary Accounting Research
CAR Vol. XX No. X (XX)
TABLE 1
GC opinions for IPO registrants and stressed public companies with Big N auditors
Panel A: IPO registrants with GC opinions by SEC ﬁling date
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 Total
Internet IPO
registrants
20.8%
(5 of 24)
28.9%
(11 of 38)
15.9%
(10 of 63)
8.8%
(34 of 385)
5.7%
(14 of 246)
9.8%
(74 of 756)
Non-Internet
IPO registrants
11.8%
(83 of 703)
9.3%
(75 of 804)
7.1%
(47 of 659)
16.2%
(79 of 487)
18.8%
(127 of 677)
12.3%
(411 of 3,330)
Total IPO
registrants
12.1%
(88 of 727)
10.2%
(86 of 842)
7.9%
(57 of 722)
13.0%
(113 of 872)
15.3%
(141 of 923)
11.9%
(485 of 4,086)
Notes:
We identify IPO registrants as those that ﬁle an S-1 or SB-2 registration statement (available on
Edgar) as their initial SEC ﬁling from January 1, 1996 to December 31, 2000. Internet IPO
registrants are those http://www.alert-ipo.com designates ‘‘Internet related’’. Non-Internet
registrants are all other, excluding ‘‘blank check’’ IPOs (SIC 6770). Table cells depict the frac-
tion (count) of IPO registrants with a GC opinion in any of their SEC registration statements,
which we sort by the day on which registrants ﬁle their initial registration statement.
Panel B: Stressed Big N public companies with GC opinions by ﬁscal year end date
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 Total
Stressed public
companies
12.6%
(118 of 939)
11.8%
(213 of 1,802)
11.9%
(250 of 2,098)
13.9%
(304 of 2,182)
12.9%
(267 of 2,068)
12.7%
(1,152 of 9,089)
Variable E[sign]
Constant )0.49 ()2.74)*** )0.36 ()2.11)**
Distress + 1.44 (29.81)*** 1.44 (29.80)***
Ln(Assets) – )0.22 ()19.18)*** )0.23 ()19.84)***
GDPGrowth – )2.17 ()0.62) )4.96 ()1.52)
FYE1998–1999 + ⁄ – 0.10 (3.29)***
Observations 9,089 9,089
Pseudo R2 22.6% 22.7%
Notes:
Observations are companies on COMPUSTAT with ﬁscal years 1995 to 1999 (i.e., likely to have
audit opinion dates 1996 to 2000) with Big N auditors, any of our three ﬁnancial distress indi-
cators (negative net income, operating cash ﬂow or stockholders’ equity) and an audit opinion
that is available on Edgar. We exclude companies in our Internet IPO sample, those with 6xxx
SIC codes, those with a ﬁscal year end that precedes its ﬁrst public year, and those without
information to compute Distress and Ln(Assets). Dependent variable is GCOpinion (one if a
going-concern opinion in an IPO registration statement and zero otherwise). Probit coefﬁcients
with t-statistics using standard errors clustered by both audit ﬁrm and company in parenthe-
ses. Distress and Ln(Assets) are deﬁned in Table 3, GDPGrowth is the average growth in U.S.
gross domestic product for the four quarters of the given ﬁscal year and FYE1998–1999 equals
one if the company’s ﬁscal year is either 1998 or 1999.
***, **, * Signiﬁcant at 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively (one-sided tests
where E[sign] is directional).
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1998 to 923 in 2000.15 From 1996 through 1998, Internet registrants comprise a minor
portion of the market, increasing from 3.3 percent in 1996 to 8.7 percent in 1998; and, for
these three years, a higher fraction of Internet registrants have GC opinions than non-In-
ternet registrants (i.e., 20.8 percent, or 26 of 125, for Internet registrants versus 9.5 per-
cent, or 205 of 2,166, for non-Internet registrants). In 1999, however, as the number of
Internet IPO registrants increases dramatically (in excess of 500 percent, from 63 in 1998
to 385 in 1999) to comprise 44.2 percent of the market, this pattern in the frequency of
GC opinions reverses. Whereas the percentage of Internet registrants with GC opinions
decreases from 15.9 percent in 1998 to 8.8 percent in 1999, for non-Internet registrants it
increases from 7.1 percent to 16.2 percent.16,17
The decrease in GC opinions for Internet IPO registrants is also inconsistent with the
COMPUSTAT population of stressed companies with Big N auditors. As panel B of
Table 1 shows, for public ﬁrms with Big N auditors and ﬁscal 1995–1997 ﬁnancial state-
ment dates (likely 1996–1998 audit opinion dates) and any of our three indicators of stress,
the GC rate averages 12.0 percent (12.6 percent in 1995, 11.8 percent in 1996, 11.9 percent
in 1997). Then, as with non-Internet IPO registrants, the GC rate for these companies
increases to an average of 13.4 percent (13.9 percent in 1998, 12.9 percent in 1999) for
1998–1999 ﬁnancial statement dates (likely 1999–2000 opinion dates).18 We pool
these years and regress the presence of a GC opinion on the probability of bankruptcy
(Zmijewski 1984), the natural logarithm of total assets, the annual growth in U.S. gross
domestic product (GDP), and an indicator variable equal to one if the ﬁscal year is 1998
or 1999. We cluster standard errors on company and audit ﬁrm (Thompson 2011). As per
panel B of Table 1, the coefﬁcient on the 1998–1999 indicator variable is positive.
15. Of the 12 quarters during 1996–1998, Yung et al. (2008) categorize: 10 of them as a ‘‘hot’’ IPO market
using their growth rate in real private nonresidential ﬁxed investment heat index (InvestGr); 10 of them as
hot using their number of new issues heat index (NumIPO); and 2 of them as hot using their equally
weighted underpricing heat index (EWU). Of the 8 quarters that comprise 1999–2000, Yung et al. (2008)
categorize: 2 of them as a hot IPO market using InvestGr; 1 of them as hot using NumIPO; and 8 of them
as a hot IPO market using EWU.
16. Using the same approach we follow to identify whether a non-Internet registrant has a GC opinion, we
also identify a registrant’s audit ﬁrm. The same pattern that we document for all non-Internet IPO regis-
trants (i.e., an increase in the rate of GC opinions for registrants ﬁling an S-1 or SB-2 in 1999 versus
1998) is also present for non-Internet IPO registrants with both Big N (from 4.8 percent to 6.1 percent)
and non–Big N audit ﬁrms (from 12.8 percent to 28.3 percent).
17. To examine this using a different approach, we identify non-Internet companies new to COMPUSTAT
for ﬁscal 1995 to 1999 with Big N auditors, any of our distress indicators (negative net income, operating
cash ﬂow, or stockholders’ equity) and data for total assets, net income, debt, current assets, and current
liabilities. Of note, in contrast to other aspects of our analysis, these are companies that successfully went
public. For those with IPO year 1995–1997 ﬁnancial statement dates (likely to have 1996–1998 audit opin-
ion dates), the GC rate is 5.6 percent; for those with IPO year 1998–1999 ﬁnancial statement dates (likely
to have 1999–2000 audit opinion dates), the GC rate is 4.9 percent. We combine these companies and
regress the presence of a GC opinion on the probability of bankruptcy per Zmijewski 1984, the natural
logarithm of total assets, the annual growth in GDP, and an indicator variable equal to one if the ﬁscal
year is 1998 or 1999. We cluster standard errors on audit ﬁrm. The coefﬁcient on the time-period indicator
variable is insigniﬁcant. We note, however, that this analysis suffers from several limitations (e.g., it is sub-
ject to selection bias for companies that actually went public and it relies on the availability of COMPU-
STAT data whose reliability, unlike the Internet IPO sample, we do not verify by examining the IPO
prospectus).
18. Arguably more important than the difference in the direction of change between stressed public companies
and our stressed Internet IPO sample is the magnitude of the difference. During 1996–1998, the difference
is )0.6 percent, or 12.0 percent for stressed, non-IPO companies minus 12.6 percent for stressed Internet
IPO companies. During 1999–2000, the difference increases to 10.6 percent, or 13.4 percent for stressed,
non-IPO companies minus 2.8 percent for stressed Internet IPO companies; which is a weighted average
of 2.6 percent bubble and 7.7 percent post-bubble (see panel B of Table 2 for details).
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These results are important because our initial test uses a time-period indicator vari-
able to capture changes in auditor GC decisions. However, other factors may inﬂuence
such decisions in a given time period. If these other factors affect auditor opinion decisions
overall, we could also observe a decline in the rate of GC opinions in the general popula-
tion. By documenting that this is not the case, we reduce concerns about the inﬂuence of
these other factors.
GC reporting for stressed Internet IPO registrants
Given the above ﬁndings, we focus the remainder of our analysis on Internet IPOs. As per
panel A of Table 2, of the 756 Internet IPO registrants in panel A of Table 1 we eliminate:
75 spinoffs from public companies (see footnote 14); 39 companies that do not ﬁle to go
public on NASDAQ (OTC Bulletin Board, NQB Pink Sheets); 21 foreign registrants due
to differences in international audit standards; and one company with a pre-1996 opinion
date. Of the remaining 620, because of the importance of conditioning GC analysis on
clear indicators of stress, we exclude 34 (just 5 percent) without negative net income, nega-
tive operating cash ﬂow, or negative equity (excluding redeemable or convertible equity).
Our sample consists of 586 stressed, stand-alone, domestic Internet companies ﬁling to go
public on NASDAQ from 1996 to 2000.
Panel B of Table 2 partitions these 586 registrants by audit opinion date, audit ﬁrm
type, and audit opinion type. From the standpoint of the month the auditor signs the
opinion for these registrants, the Internet IPO audit market bubble inﬂates quickly begin-
ning in January 1999. During the previous three years, auditors signed off on 102 stressed,
domestic Internet companies ﬁling to go public on NASDAQ (i.e., 3 per month), of which
85.3 percent (87 of 102) have Big 5 auditors and 18.6 percent (19 of 102) have a GC in
their registration statement. Consistent with clientele effects, the frequency of GCs varies
by auditor type, at 12.6 percent for Big 5 versus 53.3 percent for non–Big 5 (z-statistic for
the change in proportions of )3.95, signiﬁcant beyond 1 percent).
For the next 16 months, January 1999 through April 2000, auditors sign opinions for
470 stressed NASDAQ Internet IPO registrants (i.e., 30 per month), of which 96.6 percent
(454 of 470) have Big 5 auditors and 4.3 percent (20 of 470) have GC opinions.19 The
decrease in GCs stems from registrants with Big 5 auditors, as their GC rate drops from
12.6 percent during 1996–1998 to 2.6 percent during January 1999–April 2000 (z-statistic
)4.24, signiﬁcant beyond 1 percent).20 As Figure 1 depicts, the frequency of Big 5 GCs
decreases abruptly to 2.5 percent (3 of 120) during the ﬁrst quarter of 1999 (i.e., prior to
the doubling of the NASDAQ Composite Index from April 1999 to March 2000) from
16.7 percent (3 of 18) in the ﬁrst quarter of 1998. In contrast, the frequency of GCs for
registrants with non–Big 5 auditors, which did not experience an increase in stressed Inter-
net IPO audits, decreases to 50.0 percent (8 of 16) during January 1999–April 2000 from
53.3 percent (8 of 15) during 1996–1998 (z-statistic )0.19, insigniﬁcant). For the remainder
of 2000, May through December, auditors sign opinions for just 14 stressed NASDAQ
Internet IPO registrants, of which 13 have a Big 5 auditor and one has a GC opinion. To
accord with our regression framework, for which the intercept pertains to companies that
auditors opine on during non-bubble periods, panel B of Table 2 provides results of tests
19. The time period we deﬁne as the Internet audit-market bubble is consistent with the empirical ﬁnance liter-
ature (e.g., Schultz and Zaman 2001; Ljungqvist and Wilhelm 2003; Bradley et al. 2008).
20. Other than Arthur Andersen, which did not render a single GC opinion for any of its eight pre-bubble
stressed Internet clients, each Big 5 ﬁrm evidenced a decrease in GC frequency during the period from
January 1999 through April 2000. There is also variation in auditor ﬁrm market share (e.g., PwC audits
33 percent of our overall sample while D&T audits just 7 percent) and whereas the market share of some
ﬁrms expanded from pre-bubble to bubble (e.g., AA’s went from 8 percent to 19 percent), the market
share of other ﬁrms contracted (e.g., KPMG 23 percent pre-bubble to 14 percent bubble).
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TABLE 2
Internet IPO sample
Panel A: Internet IPO sample of NASDAQ ﬁlings by standalone, domestic, stressed registrants
Internet IPO registrants per panel A of Table 1 756
Less:
Spinoffs from an already-public parent company (4 with GC opinions) 75
Companies that do not ﬁle to go public on NASDAQ (28 with GC opinions) 39
Foreign company registrants (2 with GC opinions) 21
Audit opinion date is prior to January 1, 1996 (0 with GC opinions) 1
Companies with no obvious indication of ﬁnancial stress (0 with GC opinions) 34
Final sample 586
Panel B: Internet IPO sample by audit opinion date by audit ﬁrm type and by GC opinion
Audit
Opinion
Date
Big 5 Auditors Non–Big 5 Auditors Overall
GC
Opinion
Non–
GC
Opinion Total
GC
Opinion
Non–
GC
Opinion Total
GC
Opinion
Non–
GC
Opinion Total
1996 Qtr1 0 2 2 0 0 0 0 2 2
Qtr2 1 6 7 0 1 1 1 7 8
Qtr3 1 2 3 1 1 2 2 3 5
Qtr4 1 1 2 1 1 2 2 2 4
1997 Qtr1 2 9 11 1 0 1 3 9 12
Qtr2 0 5 5 0 0 0 0 5 5
Qtr3 0 4 4 0 0 0 0 4 4
Qtr4 1 4 5 1 0 1 2 4 6
1998 Qtr1 3 15 18 1 1 2 4 16 20
Qtr2 0 10 10 1 1 2 1 11 12
Qtr3 0 9 9 1 1 2 1 10 11
Qtr4 2 9 11 1 1 2 3 10 13
Pre-Bubble 11
(12.6%)
76
(87.4%)
87 8
(53.3%)
7
(46.7%)
15 19
(18.6%)
83
(81.4%)
102
1999 Qtr1 3 117 120 3 3 6 6 120 126
Qtr2 2 77 79 0 1 1 2 78 80
Qtr3 2 48 50 2 0 2 4 48 52
Qtr4 1 48 49 1 1 2 2 49 51
2000 Qtr1 3 133 136 2 3 5 5 136 141
April 1 19 20 0 0 0 1 19 20
Audit Bubble 12
(2.6%)
442
(97.4%)
454 8
(50.0%)
8
(50.0%)
16 20
(4.3%)
450
(95.7%)
470
(The table is continued on the next page.)
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of differences in proportions between audit bubble and a combination of pre-bubble and
post-bubble periods.21
Independent variables for stressed Internet IPO registrants
Our independent variables comprise covariates and variables of interest. We specify ﬁve
control variables. Distress is per Zmijewski 1984, and includes return on assets, leverage,
and current ratio, all per the audited ﬁnancial statements in the IPO registration state-
ment. Assets is total assets, also from the audited balance sheet in the registration state-
ment. Of note, Distress and Assets encompass four of the ﬁve major factors (i.e.,
proﬁtability, leverage, liquidity, and size) extant literature associates with GC opinions.22
Age is the number of years from company founding (or incorporation, if founding date is
unavailable) and IPO ﬁling. StartUp equals one if annualized, pre-IPO revenues are less
than $1 million. GDP3 is the average growth in the U.S. GDP for the three months prior
to the month the auditor signs the opinion in the registration statement. We specify ten
test variables of interest, four proxy for mitigating factors which are client or market
determinants of GCs (CashBurn, Nasdaq3, PrestigeIB, VC) and six proxy for auditor
determinants (AuditBubble, Fees3, DotName, NorthCalif, RushToMkt, RushToMkt*VC).
TABLE 2 (Continued)
Audit
Opinion
Date
Big 5 Auditors Non–Big 5 Auditors Overall
GC
Opinion
Non–
GC
Opinion Total
GC
Opinion
Non–
GC
Opinion Total
GC
Opinion
Non–
GC
Opinion Total
2000 May 1 3 4 0 0 0 1 3 4
Jun 0 3 3 0 1 1 0 4 4
Qtr3 0 6 6 0 0 0 0 6 6
Qtr4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Post-Bubble 1
(7.7%)
12
(92.3%)
13 0
(0.0%)
1
(100.0%)
1 1
(7.1%)
13
(92.9%)
14
Overall 24
(4.3%)
530
(95.7%)
554 16
(50.0%)
16
(50.0%)
32 40
(6.8%)
546
(93.2%)
586
Tests of difference in proportions:
• 2.6% Big 5 Bubble versus 12.0% Big 5 Non-Bubble: z-statistic = )4.16 (signiﬁcant beyond 1%)
• 50.0% Non–Big 5 Bubble versus 50.0% Non–Big 5 Non-Bubble: z-statistic = 0.00 (insigniﬁcant)
• 2.6% Big 5 Bubble versus 50.0% Non–Big 5 Bubble: z-statistic = )9.23 (signiﬁcant beyond 1%)
• 12.0% Big 5 Non-Bubble versus 50.0% Non–Big 5 Non-Bubble z-statistic = )3.74 (signiﬁcant
beyond 1%)
21. All these descriptive ﬁndings hold when comparing the 16-month bubble with the surrounding 44 months.
22. Following Chen and Church 1992 and Foster, Ward, and Woodroof 1998, we also specify a variable equal
to one if a registrant has a debt footnote that discloses a payment default, covenant violation, or a default
or violation has been waived ⁄ cured. In contrast to literature, but consistent with descriptive statistics, this
variable’s coefﬁcient is negative in certain GC regression speciﬁcations. This is likely because the large
majority of cases where this variable equals one are when a creditor waives a payment default or cures a
covenant violation. Consequently, given a creditor’s knowledge of a debtor’s plans to go public, such
waivers or cures are not an unambiguous negative signal for Internet IPO registrants. We exclude this var-
iable from the results we table, as including it has no effect on our results or inferences. We also consider
the number of days from ﬁnancial statement date to opinion date. Again in contrast to literature but con-
sistent with descriptive statistics, this variable’s coefﬁcient is negative in our GC regression speciﬁcations
and including it has no effect on results that we table or inferences we advance.
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Descriptive statistics for stressed Internet IPO registrants
Table 3 presents descriptive statistics by audit opinion date and type. Panels A and B
are for registrants with Big 5 and non–Big 5 auditors, respectively. In general, stressed
Internet IPO registrants with GC opinions have higher Distress, lower Assets, are youn-
ger in Age, more likely in StartUp stage, less likely to have prestigious underwriters
(PrestigeIB) and venture capital backing (VC) than stressed Internet IPO registrants with
clean opinions.23
Figure 1 NASDAQ IPO ﬁlings by stressed Internet companies by audit ﬁrm type
23. The GC rate declines, from pre-bubble to bubble, for Big 5 registrants both with and without venture cap-
ital backing. For those registrants with venture backing, the GC rate declines from 4.9 percent pre-bubble
(3 of 61) to 1.6 percent bubble (6 of 386); z-statistic for the change in proportions of –1.69, signiﬁcant
beyond 10 percent, two-tailed test. For registrants without venture backing, the GC rate declines from
30.8 percent pre-bubble (8 of 26) to 8.8 percent bubble (6 of 68); z-statistic for the change in proportions
of –2.67, signiﬁcant beyond 1 percent, two-tailed test.
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In terms of differences among Big 5 registrants, mean and median Distress declines
from pre-AuditBubble to AuditBubble (e.g., for non-GC registrants, average Distress goes
from 0.302 to 0.288). This is likely due to the increase in venture-backed Big 5 registrants
during the bubble, since venture capitalists often infuse pre-IPO companies with cash,
which decreases Distress. During the pre-bubble period, mean (median) Distress for
non-GC registrants without venture backing is 0.336 (0.040) versus 0.430 (0.148) for such
companies during the bubble.
As for our main proxy for the effect of equity market expectations on auditor decisions,
for both pre-bubble and bubble periods the lagged quarterly raw return on the NASDAQ
Composite (Nasdaq3) is lower for IPOs with GC opinions. In terms of our proxy for ‘‘dot-
com mania’’, as one can discern from panel A of Table 3, DotName equals one for 18 of the
87 pre-bubble Big 5 registrants of which 83 percent (15 of 18) have a clean opinion; and
equals one for 126 of 454 audit-bubble Big 5 registrants of which 97 percent (122 of 126)
have a clean opinion. In addition, stressed Big 5 Internet IPO registrants with GCs are more
likely to have an auditor with lower recent fees from auditing such clients (Fees3), and less
likely to have venture backing, an audit ﬁrm from the San Francisco area (NorthCalif), and
to ﬁle their ﬁrst registration statement within ten days of audit opinion date (Rush-
ToMkt*VC).24 As for our proxy for pressure on auditors to facilitate a registrant’s ‘‘rush to
market’’, for Big 5 registrants RushToMkt equals one for 20 of 87 pre-bubble IPOs of which
90 percent (18 of 20) have clean opinions and for 188 of 454 audit-bubble registrants of
which 97 percent (183 of 188) have clean opinions. Lastly, Nasdaq3, Fees3, and RTM*VC
are higher, some by orders of magnitude, during the AuditBubble than pre-AuditBubble.
Table 4 provides correlations, panel A for Big 5 and panel B for non–Big 5. Focusing on
panel A, several covariates (Distress, Ln(Assets) andGDP3) and variables of interest (Nasdaq3,
PrestigeIB, VC, Ln(Fees3) andRushToMkt*VC) vary predictably with aGCopinion.
4. Empirical analysis
GC reporting for stressed Internet IPO registrants
We begin by estimating (1a), (1b), and (1c) separately for registrants with Big 5 and non–
Big 5, and then test AuditBubble’s coefﬁcient in (1c) for equality between these sets of
audit ﬁrms. Because GC opinion decisions by a given audit ﬁrm are not likely to be
independent, we compute robust standard errors that we cluster by audit ﬁrm.25
GCOpinioni;t ¼ b0 þ b1Distressi;t þ b2LnðAssetsÞi;t þ b3LnðAgeÞi;t þ b4StartUpi;t
þ b5GDP3i;t þ ei;t ð1aÞ;
GCOpinioni;t ¼ b0 þ b1Distressi;t þ b2LnðAssetsÞi;t þ b3LnðAgeÞi;t þ b4StartUpi;t þ b5GDP3i;t
þ b6CashBurni;t þ b7Nasdaq3i;t þ b8PrestigeIBi;t þ b9VCi;t þ ei;t ð1bÞ;
GCOpinioni;t ¼ b0 þ b1Distressi;t þ b2LnðAssetsÞi;t þ b3LnðAgeÞi;t þ b4StartUpi;t
þ b5GDP3i;t þ b6CashBurni;t þ b7Nasdaq3i;t þ b8PrestigeIBi;t þ b9VCi;t
þ b10AuditBubblei;t þ ei;t ð1cÞ;
24. Per panel A of Table 3, NorthCalif equals one for: 26 of 87 pre-bubble Big 5 registrants, of which 11.5
percent (3 of 26) have GC opinions; and 143 of 454 AuditBubble Big 5 registrants, of which just 1.4
percent (2 of 143) have GC opinions.
25. Our sample contains the following 27 audit ﬁrms: Arthur Andersen, Deloitte & Touche, Ernst & Young
(E&Y), KPMG, PricewaterhouseCoopers, Coopers & Lybrand (pre-bubble period only), Price Waterhouse
(pre-bubble period only), BDO Seidman, Grant Thornton, and 18 different non-national ﬁrms (only three
of which audit more than one IPO).
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where:
GCOpinion = One if audit opinion in IPO registration statement expresses substantial
doubt about ability to continue as a going concern and zero otherwise
Distress = Zmijewski’s (1984) index (see Table 3B 40:800 choice-based sample)
Ln(Assets) = Natural logarithm of pre-IPO total assets (in $ millions)
Ln(Age) = Natural logarithm of one plus number of years from founding ⁄ incorpo-
ration to IPO ﬁling
StartUp = One if annualized pre-IPO revenues are less than $1 million and zero
otherwise
GDP3 = Average Gross Domestic Product growth for the 3 calendar months prior
to the month of the audit opinion in the IPO registration statement
CashBurn = ((Annual pre-IPO operating cash ﬂows + annual pre-IPO investing cash
ﬂows) ‚ (Pre-IPO cash and marketable securities + actual or expected
IPO proceeds)) * ()1)
Nasdaq3 = Cumulative return for the NASDAQ Composite Index for the three calen-
dar months prior to the month of the audit opinion in the IPO registra-
tion statement
PrestigeIB = One if underwriter has the highest Carter, Dark, and Singh 1998 rank (as
Loughran and Ritter 2004 update) and zero otherwise
VC = One if the registrant has venture capital backing and zero otherwise
AuditBubble = One if date of the audit opinion in the IPO registration statement is
between January 1, 1999 and April 30, 2000 and zero otherwise
The ﬁrst three columns of Table 5 present results of estimating (1a), (1b), and (1c)
using the 554 stressed Internet IPO registrants with Big 5 auditors. In terms of vari-
ables standard in extant GC studies, the coefﬁcients for Distress and Ln(Age) are sig-
niﬁcant in the directions we expect. Column two presents results after specifying
additional variables speciﬁc to our IPO context. Of these, CashBurn, PrestigeIB, and
VC are signiﬁcant in the directions we expect, and their inclusion doubles the regres-
sion’s explanatory power.26 Of note, as per column 3 of Table 5, AuditBubble’s coefﬁ-
cient is negative and signiﬁcant with a marginal effect of about 4 percent. Therefore,
consistent with the test of difference in proportions in Table 2 panel B, the 2.6 percent
rate of GC opinions for Big 5 registrants during the audit-market bubble is signiﬁ-
cantly less than the 12.0 percent GC rate during the surrounding pre- and post-bubble
periods.27
26. We also specify, as an alternative proxy for the inﬂuence of equity market conditions, average IPO under-
pricing for the three calendar months prior to the month the auditor signs the opinion in the IPO registra-
tion statement. However, likely due to its collinearity with Nasdaq3 (Pearson correlation 0.64), this
underpricing variable is insigniﬁcant and specifying it instead of Nasdaq3 has no effect on any results we
table or inferences we advance.
27. We also estimate the following regression separately for non-bubble and bubble periods (of note, because
during the bubble period the correlation between GDP3 and Nasdaq3 is 0.83 we exclude these two time-
period variables):
GCOpinioni;t ¼ b0 þ b1Distressi;t þ b2LnðAssetsÞi;t þ b3LnðAgeÞi;t þ b4StartUpi;t
þ b5CashBurni;t þ b6PrestigeIBi;t þ b7VCi;t þ ei;t
The pseudo r-squared is 27.8 percent for the 100-observation non-bubble regression and 13.9 percent for
the 454-observation bubble regression. Upon conducting t-tests of equality of coefﬁcient estimates between
non-bubble and bubble, we cannot reject a null hypothesis of no difference beyond 10 percent for any vari-
ables (the coefﬁcient closest to changing is that for Distress, which goes from 0.958 non-bubble to 0.394
bubble — a t-statistic for a test of equality of )1.56).
Auditors and Market Euphoria 23
CAR Vol. XX No. X (XX)
T
A
B
L
E
5
G
C
o
p
in
io
n
s
fo
r
N
A
S
D
A
Q
IP
O
ﬁ
li
n
g
s
b
y
st
re
ss
ed
B
ig
5
a
n
d
N
o
n
–
B
ig
5
In
te
rn
et
re
g
is
tr
a
n
ts
V
a
ri
a
b
le
E
[s
ig
n
]
B
ig
5
IP
O
R
eg
is
tr
a
n
ts
N
o
n
–
B
ig
5
IP
O
R
eg
is
tr
a
n
ts
E
q
(1
a
)
E
q
(1
b
)
E
q
(1
c)
E
q
(1
a
)
E
q
(1
b
)
E
q
(1
c)
C
o
n
st
a
n
t
0
.0
7
(0
.0
7
)
)
0
.2
3
()
0
.1
8
)
0
.2
6
(0
.1
8
)
)
2
.3
9
()
1
.2
7
)
)
2
.4
7
()
1
.3
0
)
)
2
.5
2
()
1
.3
4
)
D
is
tr
es
s
+
0
.6
3
(1
3
.5
8
)*
*
*
0
.5
6
(3
.2
7
)*
*
*
0
.5
7
(3
.1
0
)*
*
*
1
.3
5
(1
.9
1
)*
*
1
.3
1
(1
.9
2
)*
*
1
.5
2
(2
.3
7
)*
*
L
n
(
A
ss
et
s)
–
)
0
.0
8
()
1
.4
3
)*
)
0
.0
3
()
0
.3
7
)
)
0
.0
4
()
0
.4
9
)
0
.1
1
(0
.9
0
)
0
.1
1
(0
.8
4
)
0
.1
0
(0
.7
4
)
L
n
(
A
g
e)
–
)
0
.2
7
()
4
.6
5
)*
*
*
)
0
.2
7
()
5
.0
4
)*
*
*
)
0
.2
6
()
3
.7
8
)*
*
*
0
.0
4
(0
.1
1
)
0
.0
3
(0
.0
9
)
0
.1
9
(0
.5
1
)
S
ta
rt
U
p
+
)
0
.0
4
()
0
.2
1
)
)
0
.0
2
()
0
.0
8
)
)
0
.0
4
()
0
.1
6
)
1
.1
7
(1
.8
4
)*
*
1
.1
9
(1
.6
9
)*
*
1
.1
8
(1
.7
8
)*
*
G
D
P
3
–
)
6
.2
8
()
1
.0
2
)
)
1
.9
5
()
0
.2
5
)
)
2
.8
8
()
0
.4
1
)
)
1
0
.3
3
()
0
.6
2
)
)
9
.1
9
()
0
.4
1
)
)
1
2
.5
1
()
0
.6
1
)
C
a
sh
B
u
rn
+
0
.9
4
(3
.1
3
)*
*
*
0
.9
5
(2
.6
4
)*
*
*
0
.5
4
(0
.2
1
)
0
.1
3
(0
.0
5
)
N
a
sd
a
q
3
–
)
1
.0
6
()
0
.8
8
)
0
.0
2
(0
.0
2
)
)
0
.2
7
()
0
.1
4
)
)
2
.0
6
()
0
.7
7
)
P
re
st
ig
eI
B
–
)
0
.4
2
()
1
.7
8
)*
*
)
0
.4
2
()
1
.7
0
)*
*
n
⁄a
n
⁄a
V
C
–
)
0
.7
8
()
6
.8
8
)*
*
*
)
0
.7
6
()
6
.1
3
)*
*
*
)
0
.3
2
()
0
.3
7
)
)
0
.4
3
()
0
.4
8
)
A
u
d
it
B
u
b
b
le
+
⁄–
)
0
.5
9
()
2
.4
3
)*
*
0
.8
7
(1
.3
3
)
O
b
se
rv
a
ti
o
n
s
5
5
4
5
5
4
5
5
4
3
2
3
2
3
2
P
se
u
d
o
R
2
8
.9
%
2
0
.9
%
2
3
.3
%
2
5
.0
%
2
5
.3
%
2
8
.0
%
N
o
te
s:
T
h
e
d
ep
en
d
en
t
v
a
ri
a
b
le
is
G
C
O
p
in
io
n
(o
n
e
if
a
g
o
in
g
-c
o
n
ce
rn
o
p
in
io
n
in
a
n
IP
O
re
g
is
tr
a
ti
o
n
st
a
te
m
en
t
a
n
d
ze
ro
o
th
er
w
is
e)
.
P
ro
b
it
co
ef
ﬁ
ci
en
ts
w
it
h
t-
st
a
ti
st
ic
s
u
si
n
g
st
a
n
d
a
rd
er
ro
rs
cl
u
st
er
ed
b
y
a
u
d
it
ﬁ
rm
in
p
a
re
n
th
es
es
.
S
ee
T
a
b
le
s
2
a
n
d
3
fo
r
sa
m
p
le
in
fo
rm
a
ti
o
n
a
n
d
v
a
ri
a
b
le
d
eﬁ
n
it
io
n
s.
T
h
e
m
a
rg
in
a
l
ef
fe
ct
o
f
A
u
d
it
B
u
b
b
le
’s
co
ef
ﬁ
ci
en
t
fo
r
B
ig
5
IP
O
re
g
is
tr
a
n
ts
is
)
0
.0
4
1
a
n
d
a
n
a
sy
m
p
to
ti
c
t-
te
st
o
f
eq
u
a
li
ty
o
f
A
u
d
it
B
u
b
b
le
’s
co
ef
ﬁ
ci
en
t
b
et
w
ee
n
B
ig
5
a
n
d
n
o
n
–
B
ig
5
re
g
is
tr
a
n
ts
is
)
2
.0
9
,
si
g
n
iﬁ
ca
n
t
b
ey
o
n
d
th
e
5
p
er
ce
n
t
le
v
el
,
tw
o
-t
a
il
ed
.
*
*
*
,
*
*
,
*
S
ig
n
iﬁ
ca
n
t
a
t
1
p
er
ce
n
t,
5
p
er
ce
n
t,
a
n
d
1
0
p
er
ce
n
t
le
v
el
s,
re
sp
ec
ti
v
el
y
(o
n
e-
si
d
ed
te
st
s
w
h
er
e
E
[s
ig
n
]
is
d
ir
ec
ti
o
n
a
l)
.
24 Contemporary Accounting Research
CAR Vol. XX No. X (XX)
The next three columns of Table 5 present results of estimating (1a), (1b), and (1c)
using the 32 stressed Internet IPO registrants with non–Big 5 auditors. The coefﬁcients for
Distress and StartUp are signiﬁcant in the directions we expect. In contrast to the Big 5,
but consistent with the test of difference in proportions in Table 2, AuditBubble’s coefﬁ-
cient is insigniﬁcant. An asymptotic t-test of equality for AuditBubble’s coefﬁcient between
the Big 5 and non–Big 5 is )2.09, signiﬁcant beyond the 5 percent level (Ben-Akiva and
Lerman 1985). Taken together, these results show a signiﬁcant decrease in Big 5 GC opin-
ions during the Internet IPO audit-market bubble, using both the Big 5 non-bubble and
the non–Big 5 as counterfactuals.
Examining the decrease in Big 5 GC opinions during the Internet IPO audit-market bubble
In this section, we conduct tests of auditor-speciﬁc determinants that could lead the
Big 5 to shift their GC criteria during the Internet IPO audit-market bubble. To do
this, we estimate (2), which augments (1c) by replacing AuditBubble with the variables
we discuss in Section 2: Ln(Fees3), DotName, NorthCalif, RushToMkt and Rush-
ToMkt*VC.
GCOpinioni;t ¼ b0 þ b1Distressi;t þ b2LnðAssetsÞi;t þ b3LnðAgeÞi;t þ b4StartUpi;t
þ b5GDP3i;t þ b6CashBurni;t þ b7Nasdaq3i;t þ b8PrestigeIBi;t þ b9VCi;t
þ b10LnðFees3Þi;t þ b11DotNamei;t þ b12NorthCalifi;t þ b13RushToMkti;t
þ b14RushToMkt  VCi;t þ ei;t ð2Þ;
where:
Ln(Fees3) = Natural logarithm of cumulative fees pertaining to stressed Internet
IPO registrants for which a given Big 5 audit ﬁrm has signed opinions
during the three calendar months prior to the month they sign their
opinion for a stressed Internet IPO registrant
DotName = One if registrant’s name contains ‘‘dot com’’, ‘‘dot net’’, or ‘‘Internet’’
and zero otherwise
NorthCalif = One if auditor’s ofﬁce is within 50 miles of San Francisco, California
and zero otherwise
RushToMkt = One if the number of days from audit opinion date to initial IPO
registration statement ﬁling date is ten or less and zero otherwise
RushToMkt*VC = RushToMkt*VC
For exposition, column 1 of Table 6 repeats column 2 of Table 5. Columns 2 through
5 of Table 6 present results of specifying these variables separately and column 6 presents
the results of estimating (2). For all speciﬁcations, the signs and magnitudes of covariates
common to estimating (1b) do not change. In terms of our variables of interest, the coefﬁ-
cients for DotName and NorthCalif, while negative, are insigniﬁcant.28 These ﬁndings do
not support inferences of dotcom mania or fear of client loss by the Big 5. In contrast, the
coefﬁcients for Ln(Fees3) and RushToMkt*VC are negative and signiﬁcant. Neither of
these ﬁndings can be explained by appealing to auditing standards. Rather, the inverse
relation between GCOpinion and Ln(Fees3) is consistent with less auditor independence,
in that as the recent magnitude of a given Big 5 ﬁrm’s fees from auditing stressed Internet
IPO registrants was increasing that ﬁrm became less likely to render a GC opinion.
28. Excluding these variables has no effect on our results (e.g., if we omit DotName and NorthCalif from (2)
in the last column of Table 6, the coefﬁcient on Ln(Fees3) remains at )0.06 and its t-statistic goes from
)2.96 to )3.13 and the coefﬁcient on RushToMkt*VC remains at )0.61 and its t-statistic goes from )2.86
to )2.75).
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The inverse relation between GCOpinion and RushToMkt*VC is consistent with auditors
yielding to pressure from venture capitalists to ensure that the companies they are rushing
to market have clean audit opinions.29,30
Endogeneity of the going-public decision
Because owners and managers likely condition their decision to ﬁle to go public in part on
the type of audit opinion they receive, and auditors likely make their decision to render a
GC opinion conditional in part on owners’ or managers’ plans to try to go public, the
endogeneity of the going-public decision is a concern. As a consequence, it is hard to look
at the empirical relation between the abrupt change to euphoric audit-market conditions
that took place in January 1999 for stressed Internet IPO registrants and the presence of a
Big 5 GC opinions and draw strong casual inferences. From an econometric perspective,
our ﬁndings may be subject to a selection problem because our sample is censored since it
contains only companies that nonrandomly ﬁle to go public. Such a sample can bias esti-
mates if the decision to try to go public is correlated with errors in the GC regressions
because the conditional expectation of the error term is not zero and parameter estimates
are not consistent (Heckman 1979).
Although we emphasize that our analysis is conditional on the population of stressed
Internet companies that attempt to go public, and do not extend our inferences to the
population of all Internet companies, ideally we would obtain data for all private Internet
companies and estimate ﬁrst-stage (ﬁle-to-go-public) and second-stage (going-concern)
regressions with adjustment for sample selection. However, because of issues with data
availability (Pagano, Panetta, and Zingales 1998), we cannot estimate the ﬁrst-stage regres-
sion. Nevertheless, because the impact of censoring depends on the sample selection rule,
the issue distills to whether there are motivations for going public that plausibly correlate
with the auditor’s going-concern decision. As Brau and Fawcett (2006) summarize, the
ﬁnance literature posits four primary motivations for going public: to minimize the cost of
capital, to facilitate takeover activity, to serve strategic motives, and to allow insiders to
‘‘cash out’’. Among these, the last reason may pertain to the GC decision and have an
association with our ﬁndings. If a stressed Internet company ﬁles to go public to facilitate
a venture capitalist investors’ exit strategy, then the sharp decrease in the frequency of Big
5 GC opinions starting in January 1999 could be endogenous with the client’s going-public
decision.31
29. It is possible that the relation between a GC opinion and the RushToMkt*VC variable runs in the other
direction in that a ‘‘clean’’ opinion may lead to a shorter lag between audit opinion date and SEC ﬁling
date. For two reasons, the likelihood the causality runs in this direction is low: one, the coefﬁcient for
RushToMkt*VC of )0.61 for the full sample of 554 Big 5 registrants in the Table 6, column 6 regression
decreases to )0.86 for the subsample of 454 Big 5 registrants during the 16-month audit-market bubble;
and two, during the Big 5 audit market bubble, the GC rate between Internet IPO registrants with a ﬁling
lag of 10 days or fewer and those with a ﬁling lag of more than 10 days is very similar, at 2.7 percent (5
of 188) and 2.6 percent (7 of 266), respectively. Moreover, as we discuss in footnote 22, when we specify
an additional covariate for audit lag (i.e., the number of days from ﬁscal year end to audit opinion date),
the t-statistic on RushToMkt*VC in column 6 of Table 6 goes from )2.86 to )3.37.
30. Our results are robust to specifying cutoffs of 5 days (which, because not a single registrant with venture
backing and a ﬁling lag less than 5 days has a GC opinion, is the minimum value we can specify and esti-
mate the regression parameter) and 15 days (e.g., for 15 days, the coefﬁcient on RushToMkt goes from
)0.01 (t-statistic )0.07) to 0.09 (t-statistic of 0.27) and on RushToMkt*VC goes from )0.61 (t-statistic of
)2.86) to )0.85 (t-statistic )3.08)).
31. From pre-bubble to bubble, the increase is 1300 percent for stressed Internet IPO Big 5 registrants with
venture backing (1.7 per month for 1996–1998, of which 4.9 percent have GCs, to 24.1 per month for Jan-
uary 1999 to April 2000, of which 1.6 percent have GCs) versus 500 percent for stressed Internet IPO reg-
istrants without venture backing (0.7 per month for 1996–1998, of which 30.8 percent have GCs, to 4.3 per
month for January 1999 to April 2000, of which 8.8 percent have GCs).
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To examine this, we partition the Big 5 sample into subsamples by whether the regis-
trant has venture capital backing and estimate (3) for each of these two sub-samples:
GCOpinioni;t ¼ b0 þ b1Distressi;t þ b2LnðAssetsÞi;t þ b3LnðAgeÞi;t þ b4StartUpi;t
þ b5GDP3i;t þ b6CashBurni;t þ b7Nasdaq3i;t þ b8PrestigeIBi;t
þ b9LnðFees3Þi;t þ b10DotNamei;t þ b11NorthCalifi;t
þ b12RushToMkti;t þ ei;t ð3Þ:
Table 7 presents the results (for exposition, the ﬁrst column repeats the last column of
Table 6). Ln(Fees3)’s coefﬁcient derives its sign and signiﬁcance from IPO registrants
without venture backing and Distress and PrestigeIB (and RushToMkt) derive theirs from
registrants with venture backing. Though insigniﬁcant in the full sample, NorthCalif’s coef-
ﬁcient is positive (negative) for registrants without (with) venture backing. One interpreta-
tion, consistent with our argument in section 2, is because of the high concentration of
Internet companies with venture backing in this region and the familiarity auditors likely
have with their business models the costs of changing auditors are lower. Alternatively, if
auditors view stressed Internet registrants in northern California without the backing of
venture capital ﬁrms as portending higher failure risk, then a higher frequency of GC
opinions is consistent with auditor risk assessment.
TABLE 7
GC opinions for NASDAQ IPO ﬁlings by stressed Big 5 Internet registrants by venture capital (VC)
backing
Variable E[sign] Eq (2)
Without VC
backing Eq (3)
With VC
backing Eq (3)
Constant )0.15 ()0.10) 0.42 (0.17) )2.84 ()2.60)***
Distress + 0.54 (2.68)*** 0.26 (0.67) 1.16 (3.14)***
Ln(Assets) – )0.02 ()0.26) )0.15 ()1.16) 0.16 (2.08)
Ln(Age) – )0.34 ()3.63)*** )0.31 ()1.61)* )0.33 ()2.19)**
StartUp + )0.06 ()0.33) )0.19 ()0.66) 0.11 (0.36)
GDP3 – )1.73 ()0.21) 16.10 (1.28) )24.87 ()2.79)***
CashBurn + 0.84 (2.74)*** 2.22 (1.79)** 1.23 (3.22)***
Nasdaq3 – )0.76 ()0.62) )2.74 ()1.66)** 2.17 (2.53)
PrestigeIB – )0.42 ()1.66)** 0.01 (0.08) )0.78 ()2.95)***
VC – )0.67 ()3.53)*** n ⁄ a n ⁄ a
Ln(Fees3) – )0.06 ()2.96)*** )0.16 ()4.32)*** 0.03 (0.34)
DotName – )0.20 ()0.69) 0.20 (0.58) )0.54 ()0.98)
NorthCalif – )0.04 ()0.18) 0.79 (2.99)*** )0.44 ()1.73)**
RushToMkt – )0.01 ()0.07) 0.11 (0.35) )0.68 ()7.55)***
RushToMkt*VC – )0.61 ()2.86)*** n ⁄ a n ⁄ a
Observations 554 96 458
Pseudo R2 23.9% 20.6% 28.8%
Notes:
The dependent variable is GCOpinion (one if a going-concern opinion in an IPO registration state-
ment and zero otherwise). Probit coefﬁcients, with t-statistics using robust standard errors that
we cluster by audit ﬁrm in parentheses. See Tables 2 and 3 for sample and variable information.
***, **, * Signiﬁcant at 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively (one-sided tests
where E[sign] is directional).
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Beneﬁts and costs associated with the decline in Big 5 GC opinions
In terms of beneﬁts to auditors, as the results of estimating (2) in Table 6 show, we docu-
ment a negative relation between the presence of a Big 5 GC opinion and the cumulative
fees a given ﬁrm recently receives from auditing stressed Internet IPO registrants. More-
over, because they average $358 thousand per IPO, or a total of about $200 million, these
fees seem economically important. It also may have been the case that expectations of
future fees inﬂuence auditor GC decisions during the bubble, though this is difﬁcult to test
or otherwise assess.32
In terms of costs to investors, we examine the association between a pre-IPO Big 5
GC audit opinion and post-IPO negative delistings.33,34 As panel A of Table 8 shows, for
all ex post horizons, the predictive content of a pre-IPO Big 5 GC opinion declines from
pre-AuditBubble to AuditBubble (e.g., whereas 26.7 percent of pre-AuditBubble IPOs that
delist within four years had a GC opinion in their registration statement, this percentage
drops to 9.5 percent for AuditBubble IPOs).
To conduct an ex ante test, we use the Big 5’s GC decisions during the pre-bubble as
a benchmark to assess their decisions during the bubble. To do this, we estimate (1b) using
the 87 pre-bubble Big 5 registrants and use the coefﬁcients to specify the variable
E(GCOpinion) for the 454 bubble Big 5 registrants. We then sort E(GCOpinion) by decile.
Panel B of Table 8 shows: the actual GC decisions for these 454 Big 5 bubble registrants
and the 300 (of these 454) that went public within one year of initial ﬁling; for these 300
IPOs, how many delist from CRSP for negative reasons within two, three, and four years
of their IPO date; and how many of those IPOs that delist had a GC opinion in their reg-
istration statement.
In terms of predictive accuracy, the model ﬁts reasonably well as eight of the twelve
Big 5 GC opinions during the audit-market bubble reside in the top two deciles of
E(GCOpinion). In addition, consistent with the negative coefﬁcient for AuditBubble in
column three of Table 5, average E(GCOpinion) exceeds average GCOpinion, 4.0 percent
versus 2.6 percent, respectively. Lastly, while Andersen’s bubble registrants have the high-
est average E(GCOpinion) of 7.8 percent, their average GCOpinion is 2.2 percent. No
other ﬁrm exhibits a disparity of this direction and magnitude.35 One explanation for this
is that Andersen experiences the largest percentage increase, from pre-bubble to bubble, of
stressed Internet IPO registrants of any Big 5 ﬁrm (see panel C Table 2).
Of the 300 of these 454 Big 5 audit-bubble registrants that went public within a year
of initial IPO ﬁling, 35 (11.7 percent), 57 (19.0 percent) and 74 (24.7 percent) delist off
CRSP for negative reasons within two, three, and four years of their IPO date, respec-
tively.36 Of these delistings, for each post-IPO horizon, only about one in ten has a GC
opinion in their IPO registration statement.
32. Amazon.com is among the most prominent companies in our stressed Internet IPO sample. The account-
ing fees and expenses to E&Y for the Amazon.com IPO, as per their May 14, 1997 S-1 ⁄A, were $150,000.
Subsequent to this, for the eight years from 2000 to 2007, E&Y received in excess of $20 million in audit
fees from Amazon.com.
33. Following Beatty 1993 and Schultz 1993, we use CRSP codes 550–572 and 574–585 to classify IPOs that
delist for negative reasons. Of these codes, the most common are: 552, Delisted by current exchange —
price fell below acceptable level; 574, Delisted by current exchange — bankruptcy, declared insolvent; and
584, Delisted by current exchange — does not meet exchange’s ﬁnancial guidelines for continued listing.
34. We emphasize that we are not able to directly measure costs to investors but rather are suggesting that
there could be consequences to investors from underreporting of GC opinions for IPOs that subsequently
delist.
35. Of the 23 Big 5 registrants in the top 5 percent of E(GCOpinion), Andersen audited 10 (none of these 10
had a GC opinion).
36. These delisting rates accord with those in Goldfarb et al. 2007.
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TABLE 8
Post-IPO negative delistings and pre-IPO Big 5 GC opinions
Panel A: Post-IPO delistings with a GC Opinion in the IPO registration statement
Pre-AuditBubble IPOs (81 IPOs of 87 registrants)
Delist within
1 year of IPO
Delist within
2 years of IPO
Delist within
3 years of IPO
Delist within
4 years of IPO
GCOpinion in IPO
registration statement
Yes 1 (100.0%) 3 (60.0%) 3 (25.0%) 4 (26.7%)
No 0 (0.0%) 2 (40.0%) 9 (75.0%) 11 (73.3%)
AuditBubble IPOs (300 IPOs of 454 registrants)
Delist within
1 year of IPO
Delist within
2 years of IPO
Delist within
3 years of IPO
Delist within
4 years of IPO
GCOpinion in IPO
registration statement
Yes 0 (0.0%) 3 (8.6%) 6 (10.5%) 7 (9.5%)
No 1 (100.0%) 32 (91.4%) 51 (89.5%) 67 (90.5%)
Panel B: Big 5 registrants in Internet audit-market bubble by pre-bubble expected GC
Decile
PreBubble
E(GCOpinion) Big 5
Bubble
IPO ﬁlings
with a GC
Opinion
Bubble IPO
issues with a
GC Opinion
Delist with a GC
Opinion within
2 years of
IPO date
3 years of
IPO date
4 years of
IPO date
10th 32.7% 8.9% (4 of 45) 12.1% (4 of 33) 2 of 8 3 of 13 4 of 17
9th 5.3% 8.7% (4 of 46) 8.3% (3 of 36) 1 of 2 3 of 4 3 of 8
8th 1.5% 2.2% (1 of 45) 0.0% (0 of 32) 0 of 2 0 of 6 0 of 7
7th 0.5% 0.0% (0 of 46) 0.0% (0 of 32) 0 of 2 0 of 3 0 of 4
6th 0.2% 0.0% (0 of 45) 0.0% (0 of 31) 0 of 7 0 of 7 0 of 8
5th 0.1% 2.2% (1 of 45) 0.0% (0 of 32) 0 of 8 0 of 9 0 of 9
4th 0.0% 2.2% (1 of 45) 3.2% (1 of 31) 0 of 1 0 of 3 0 of 4
3rd 0.0% 0.0% (0 of 46) 0.0% (0 of 30) 0 of 2 0 of 5 0 of 7
2nd 0.0% 0.0% (0 of 45) 0.0% (0 of 25) 0 of 1 0 of 1 0 of 2
1st 0.0% 2.2% (1 of 46) 5.6% (1 of 18) 0 of 2 0 of 6 0 of 8
Total 7.8% AA 2.2% (2 of 89) 1.7% (1 of 60) 0 of 7 1 of 13 1 of 17
1.9% D&T 3.1% (1 of 32) 5.0% (1 of 20) 0 of 4 0 of 5 1 of 6
2.7% E&Y 1.8% (2 of 112) 1.4% (1 of 69) 1 of 4 1 of 9 1 of 14
2.4% KPMG 1.6% (1 of 64) 0.0% (0 of 44) 0 of 6 0 of 9 0 of 12
3.9% PwC 3.8% (6 of 157) 5.6% (6 of 107) 2 of 14 4 of 21 4 of 25
4.0% 2.6% (12 of 454) 3.0% (9 of 300) 3 of 35 6 of 57 7 of 74
Notes:
Observations are 87 (454) stressed, stand-alone, domestic Internet companies ﬁling to go public on
NASDAQ with Big 5 opinion dates January 1996 to December 1998 (January 1999 to April
2000) (see Table 2). Of these 87 (454) registrants, 81 (300) went public within one year of initial
SEC ﬁling; and, of these 81 IPOs, 1, 5, 12, and 15 (300 IPOs, 1, 35, 57, and 74) delist from CRSP
for negative reasons (delisting codes 550–572 and 574–584) within one, two, three, and four years
of IPO date, respectively. PreBubble E(GCOpinion) is the probability of a GC opinion using
coefﬁcients from estimating (1b) using the 87 pre–audit-market bubble Big 5 IPO registrants.
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Among IPO registrants in the highest decile of E(GCOpinion), the actual GC rate is
8.9 percent versus an expectation of 32.7 percent. Of the 33 (of 45) registrants in this 10th
decile that actually went public within a year of their ﬁrst registration statement, over half
of which delisted for negative reasons within four years of IPO (i.e., 17 of 33), all those
with a GC in their initial ﬁling delisted for negative reasons within four years of IPO date.
It therefore appears that had the Big 5 kept opining on stressed Internet IPO registrants
during the bubble as during the pre-bubble, a higher fraction of the registrants in this dec-
ile would have audit opinions providing an early warning to investors. We emphasize
though, that because this early-warning enhancement is less apparent at earlier post-IPO
stages, we do not assert violations of professional audit standards. Having said this,
though, we also emphasize that an IPO can delist only if it goes public in the ﬁrst place
and, because the Internet bubble burst so abruptly, approximately one-third of stressed In-
ternet IPO registrants with clean opinions never went public (e.g., 12 of the 45 registrants
in the 10th decile) and could not pose negative consequences to outside investors.
5. Conclusion
We study auditor GC opinion decisions around the time of the wave of stressed Internet
companies ﬁling to go public on NASDAQ. We ﬁnd that from January 1999 to April
2000, a time of very high volume of stressed Internet companies ﬁling to go public, the
Big 5 became less likely to render GC opinions. Upon conducting tests for determinants
that could lead auditors to shift their GC decision criteria during this euphoric market, we
ﬁnd the presence of a GC opinion varies with variables that proxy for both economic
reasons (‘‘mitigating factors’’) and for less independence and skepticism by the Big 5. It is
important to emphasize that, while we report some evidence of costs to investors associ-
ated with the decease in Big 5 GC opinions during the bubble, we do not assert reporting
inaccuracies in terms of violations of audit standards or whether a GC opinion should or
should not have been issued. Overall, though, while we do not suggest the Big 5 were a
major cause of the Internet IPO bubble, it does seem these largest audit ﬁrms did little to
slow it from inﬂating.37 Because of the potential for future bubbles, our ﬁndings may be
of interest to audit regulators and standard setters.
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